Conducted at the Aviation Psyctology Laboratory U. S. Kaval School of Aviation Medicine HAS FensaeoXa, Florida iPresented at EBB meeting, September 1952 by Richard Trtmijull Lieutenant, tSG, IBIS The greatest timber of human relations and morale studies carried on In the Naval Mr fralniag Caoamand In Pensacola diarlng receat years have been emmrmi. vlth tke preMests @f o«ali^tlmg tbe motlvati^ of HavCiaidi, &mr stu- ^ismb aviators. In the maln^ these studies have been based upon data gathered from gueetiotmaires and Intervlevs. fhe ultjpate goal of the research is the iarprovement of seleet^i®ii, the enhaneimg of morale suad utotivatlonal In- fluences associated with the training program. We have cooe to vlev l^e researeh t(S he ]^resented here today on tiro levels of ofevatlon. The first level, i&lch we say think of as the manifest level. Is concerned with the Individual's spontaneously verbcJ-lzed "reasons" for entering or for 'id.thdrawing from VHr training ^ikiipBMc- Althcro^ we have cotncersed oursel-^^s irl-lh the ini»licatlons of these "reasons, -^ey have %e«a anployed at face value in studies of their relationship to performance or iBvolveaent in the program. The aete&B& level represents latent or less manifest elements of 19ie in- dividual which jimsf emerging as significant influences upon motivation in a military setting. In these sttiMes, we have easployed other iastrments stteh as open-ended projective qMestlgnaalres deslgaed to determliie tile msl^me of the individual's attitudes. Stmdles concerned with "^ese two levels shall he presented In -^e ordet Indicated above, to be followed by a brief presentation of current, unreported findings, and projected research which should be of interest to this meeting devoted to piecing and program guidance* PJOCP I There Is, perhaps, no more appropriate point of departure for a, discus - si^ Of iB0tlvatlon than an evaluation Of the individual's reasons for entering the situation within whidbi his motivation is being studied. We ' -2- all recogaize that there are unique problems for tb@8e individuals vhose realizatioms i^on esterlBg a prograt are iridjely dlyergeiat from tb«lr aa^le- l|)ftti@Be, for thBa& eater @&e situatioQ to eseape axt®tker, f&e those tibs chose what they coasider, a priori , to be the lesser of two evils in a forced choice situation ("^e draft )j for those ^@ respond to Batleoal pr>es8mre8 which evaporate after the Irrevocable step htts been taliem^ and for those constant seekers of the fiction of security. A report of t^ervletr data gtitheret from ITavCads wlthdrswiaag from txminlng over an elgjhteen nosfth period begl^lmg early in If 50 indieated that many of these individuals had come Into "^ae training program with dlscemibly "poor motivation" at the outset (l)* In this report it was poiated out that masy 5av®«4s aeeepted for tralaing were "drifting ©r "escaping" iato Haval Aviation. It is of some interest, therefore, to consider the reasons offered by HavCads currccitly ^iterliig traiMng. A randcm sample of 2!j6 enteai^ng IfavGads were recently asked to give, anonymously, their "reasmi or reaseaas for haviiag come into the Naval Air !I!raini3ig Program. The foUowiiag factors were derived from the 855 reasons elicited j la^erest in aviation - 20.93 per cent Ei^ school aeronautics - .23 ti ti draining station near home .11 ti ti I*re^dlce toward nav&l aircraft - .23 ti n Superior naval avia,tlon training - 5.61 H n fhreat of ottier mllltwey service - ll^.85 n n Civillen t^oredom smd failure - .70 ti tt Dhcertainty of future - .23 n n Escape family Influence - .23 ft n To obtain coniELssion - 7.13 tt It a. ®pf®rtunity for career - 3.62 tt 11 b. to emt^ enlisted status - 1.63 tt It e» "better deal" (imspecified) - 3 -oh It It d. high calibre of associates - - 3.39 tt tt e. financial incentive - 1^.21 ti H f . better utilization of ability - 1.75 It n g. living c ouditions of officer - 1.87 n w -3- 2 h» prestige of officer and aviator - ^*9^ i. tmiform - ,m Eref»ration for civilian future - 9.70 To dteffeitla eollege credit - .23 It It n IT ti II It tl Pressure of ri^atives and friends - 5. lit Patriotic rmmmB - 2.33 All friends in sejnrlce - .11 " " It 11 H n Travel, adventure, aad excltem^t - 2,92 Training program a challenge - 2.22 Reputation of naval aviators - 1.52 Fbyslcal and mental conditioning - .93 Attractive recruitment propagaada - ,k6 Pleasant recruiting odf fleer - .11 n n tl n II tt It n n n II H The results indicate that approximately 3^ '^2 percent of the primary reasons given for entering the Naval Air Training Program concerned the avoidance of other type military service . This does not necessarily mean that this group has no interest in aviation. However, it prolsably indic- ates that if this group had a free choice they wouO-d remain civilians, "but Taeing faced with some fom of military service they wished to select a field that resulted im l&e greatest personal advaatt^es tm t&@ii. 0btalnijig a ec»tailBsl@n vas given as a primary reason hy 1^ percent and as a secondary reason "by another 5? percent with the major proportion of this 70 percent of the pop^atlon indicating the "Hireat of Selective Service as the primary factor in their decision. We gain some encouragement from the fact idiat 35 percent of the primary reasons reflected an interest in avla.ti@(a . There is sao means for estaMishlng -what mig^t constitute "ejected" percentages for these two factors in such a population to afford the stat- istician the usual basis for discussion. Th^ merely represent some of the llmltB within vhleh we must operate and bring a keen awamess that sudi sta- tistics also promise to be sources of morale problems in the situation where they obtain. An apfti^ml of i^e "reasons" given by cadets for wlthdr^dng from the program was conducted through interviefws with over 160 HavCads checking out on their way to civilian life, (l) This last factor is important becaiise the current practice of retaining the man in an enlisted status might have isflttence npm. the ext^t to ^leh snch "reast^" given in intervtews aiprox- inate actttality. As e^q^resBed by tlie eaOffts th«itslsves, the following isajor reasons emerge: 1. listaste for flying 2. Objections to certain Instructional techniques 3. Boredom restilting from periods of waiting k. Lack of group identification in flight training ^. Cezi^in factors exteimaJ. to the training program^ 3>g*> girl involvMnents, family pressure, etc. The investigators in this partietaar study sought to identify other factors not exj^ressed directly in the iatervievs but temporarily, or ca^ally related. These situational factors vere identified as: 1. Changes in standards of performance in training 2. Abrupt adiainistrative changes 3. Political changes as regards -^e Korean csnflict^ Seleetlve Service Laws, and the like k. Increased job oppoartunities 5. Societal changes in the realm of public opinion toward the aviator's role, toward patriotic duty, end toward the military services . The isiyplication of this study is particularly relevant to the report prestBted ab&ve of Mitfl "i^ase^s" for «at*riag Hav&I Mr Sraiaiag. I>:^t- ations of time deny a complete review of those reasons and theif relationships to the factoid identified in this study. But indicating a few, M^t under- s@@]*e the fact that iaiivldaals entering a progi^, nme^mm its natttre, do so with reasons which make them extremely vulnerable and poor morale risks. This would be especially true of the very large;, proporticm to enter Saval Aviatlmi Training to es^gvpe seae^isg else . Wk& lavtai, n&o ottered, the re> cruiting office with the flag flying in his eyes had unique problems of ad- justaeat as the eouotry ttalcl^^ retuxmed to "business as usual" and he re- ceived letters inply^ig that he had bei^ a ^emlsetr,^ The KavCiad iAt@ S0u^t a commission or security had to adjust to letters from High School or college -5- Laj. coo- 1 classmates who were making ^t-OO dollars and more per month as semi-skilled aad skilled lahor. His lot is bo easier vheB eoBfro&ted vlth Joitosoa cat- "baeks ami Cavl^ am^dtaemts . For iadivil^aale eitax^ged eeaiiiaetixtg a training program, certain of these situational factors £ire far "beyond titeiK'-^ control. In some instances, their impact x^on a greup earn tit a^tl^pated and M -ike Mlitai^ elt«iaM@n allows can "be taken to coT«ates%et the result ii^ decrease in morale. Ctoe interesting attem.pt at o^licial p^- / , trol c^P'fOiR at P^sacj6la> has s^zr^f toV estal)lish_.the^1^aal£--3^ure of fasialting in^^liKtealy ic^arMal« fhere are ©tier morale factors which one must learn to accept as a natural part of the situation, e.g., ad^^ting to laass produced €am after mjother's special attenti^. Then, toe, th«re are certain "needs^" n&i^ the iniivltaiLL ^feets to have fulfilled through identification with the military, a decision deterjained more hy vlshful than careful thii^ng. fhe only ^fecoSa^f e f^s^^it director of plaeS@s€^r Bel^«r^tSi!»^ is.^tfie~N detei^nat^n of as many factors ©redispos/ng to ppor/ morale as pdssible sele^ctl^ /i^ the 'bai eariLier rapre the sti sonnel-,.aM-^election , An appraisal of 'bMLlographleal material was conducted with a saa^le of Uf liavl^ids 1^0 had successftilly couplet ed Basic Training, 131 Salads ^im had attrited for Ground Training or Flight Failure, and 135 NavCads who had sli^da^wn from the program (2). The resnlts, pertinent to seleetlm, tocltided: 1. ^Sm ant failed grot^s were significantly older than the sue©:©stiful group. 2. Both iafce liE and failed groups included significantly more NavCads . m& S3 ^^^srs of age while the successful gr0ap had significantly ! c BKire HayCads under 21 years of age. 3. Botfe attriting groups had slj^if icantJ^ more formaJ. education than the Bttceessful group . fhe group had twice the percentage of college graduates as the successful group. k* The failed group @f HavCads shewed a significantly greater Mstory Of college falliare than the successful group. (The same -was of the DOR group although the level of significance did not quite meet the 5^ level of confidence demanded in this stuclj for sig- nificance . } With morale as the major concern of this panel, the picture presented this partlcuXar Bil i^ypalation deserres sttidy. fhey are oMer, have more formal education, and have experienced more failure in their educa- tional historyi All of -tdiese factors exert their influence upon morale, ^e influence of these factors upon m^l-mS^m end level of asiiraMi» re- quire fiarther study. Furthermore, the individuals reaction to authoritative discipline, and other faatuai^s of the militai;^ also x%qiilrea apfpraleal. The difficulties aa9e:^eineet Ts^ 't^MS^^group as repotted at the last meetiig in a study for another branch of service indicates that this problem is not miqtie with Bavai Aviation. * ^e letters DOR are eomoBly used as an abbreviation for *'dircir|prped at own request." PART II Now let us consider the studies devoted to determining the unverbal- Ized elements Ix^lled or derived trm ^^wgrn^kt^tm. fbe tiro stuiieB to be meatl^ed were based vcpm eBsestlally "^e siiif ztctsifloale, Banely, ^Ital certaim Of the social attitudes which an individual brings- to a training Situation will isfluemee Ms level of morale and aotlYatloB -^ere. la tbe ease &t all of these studies t^e attitudes scncbtolttd i^^msf^ramsH in nature. fhe first study in this grs^ solicited Bsmym&m resf^ases frsn Qmmm^ te a eritleaL-^laeidemt t^fe fBestl@msai^« i#bei«ia they i«re as^feet to fj^pNiit first on their "best" and then on their "worit" instructor. ^Uhe sanrple ^lllsied eoBsistedf of a gprosrp of T2 caitto vho irere vlthdrawlBg from tralnlag ict ^Helr mm, refctsst mA. % v&o hat sneeessfully compMed the f ifst •Bii^m iphase of fligtit training, Basic. These two groups were refeKPet t®, respectively, as the "low" aad the lilgh" notivatloB groeps. A em%mt smalysls ef r^spotstses trm the ttro grmi$B reiirealed '^e cadets in iSIm "low" motivation group reported significantly more incidents of instructor eiapetenee or Imea^^petemce vblle the ^^l^** aotlKEtiea gpowp tended to rcr^ort slgnlfieas^ly mo3*e ineiSKits liE^l'rliif lBte3*perseaiKl relatien^ps «lth in- struet0i*B. Overall, it was conclufliet that padffes in ^le "higji" group vere ai©re leeadlly dtirgfesed to identify with a«th@rlty-figares — that Is, offieer-lnstrttetors tiam. were the "lows," One question which this research did not satisfactorily answer was the extent to ^leh the attitudes which were studied had been eondltieneS 1^ the training experience. It might hare been argiled, with justification, that the differences found in attitude toward the officer-instructors were a -2- II function of motivatton — ratjaer than tlxe converse. As a consequence, a , enteriag tratsiag vere asked t© respond to a siailar form dealing irltM ia- structors previously encountered in high school or college. Follow-ilp data -was them gathered^ after a period of six months, relative to the disposition of the 3®®-o^ okll^l^n the study safflple^ M ia^lysls of the resi@fises given hy •*''Pi|-^fflf^-~^" vho subsequently withdrew from training at tbelr own re- quest was then Inlt^ted and contrasted with a parallel analysis of the responses given "by^PMs -^^o had remained In tratnlng. fhese two groups exhihited the same differences relative to attitudes toward high school and college t^db.ers as the previously studle4 gromps 1^ shotm In the millttixy sitmtlon. ThnSf therei was some basls|4^cltid±Qg that ll^ese attitudes not only accomrpanied varying levels of motivation — as we have here defined it— 'but, furthermore, had their roots In earlier ea^erience. Yet to be reported upon are a number of studies in which projective questionnaires of the sentence efsspletlon type are being adalnlstered to groups of who have wlthdiwm from or failed in training as well as to a group -ofe^vtake who are successfxil in training, the latter group serving as a control. In addition to these, a stu^ is nearlng caa^leticm in which the role of social values is being evaluated as a differential predictor of success in training. The ultijnate purpose to which the findings of these investigations will be directed is that of liaproved selection. One major project still in the data-gathering stage involves the de- velopment and refinement of an attitude inventory which is made up of items dealing with various social Institutions acid forms, ^lle in a marl^edly dlffeeent guise, this Invs^tory utilize s the same coacsfpttJ*! model disemssed -3- ' II in connection with the studie^of auttmrlty -figures^ iiiirt jjjfjjin . A prelim- tmsry aimlyBls of the data olitaijied. from sereral himdred Sa^CJads to vha^ the ±tttent&ry was administered at the o^set &f tx^imiBg has laictLea%6i t^t eer- taljn of Idaese attltude-iteaais discriminate at a significant level "between ifijrlrp Tfhi later vlthdraif frcmi, as opposed toUiose vho reaaln In training. It is her|>ed -^t, mltinatel^T; these Items may sefFve as a nuele\is for -^e development of an attitude scale which will effectively identify applicants whcsn tre might predict will he Inadequately motivated er m&ladapted In training. £/m^<3*' M 4 1 P " ^ ^ ^/^/^^jf, Another prohlaa which is cxirrently being pursued concerns the develop- ment of a more adetoate criterion of motivation. O&e project In i&ls area has attempted t# define motivation iJbems of a Slsexvpaa&af score hetveen the Individual's ahllity level as measured prior to Pre-Flight and his perform- ance level while in Pre-Fllght. It should he emphasized that the Indivlisial la eadh instsatee Is being compared with himself. Even a hrdef e«asiaeratlon of this problem will Indicate that there are various difficulties which arise. For one thing, @ne may ^eestlon whether an a'bllity measure — say the ACT — correlates at a' smff lelently high level with Pre-Fllghfc grades to iharrsBat -^e assertion that a negative discrepancy of some mgnltude may be considered to be Indicative of flagging motivation or vice v^rsa. At any rate, some ex- ploratory work on this problea has be^ done ttalslng tise of the ACE Test as an ability measure and the final academic average at Pre-Flight as the perform- ance measure, fhe restilts Indicate that Indlvidtmls who later BOB la fll^t training .show a marked and significant iBcllnatlOE toward a negative score K&lle iiaii^ who are successful in Basic Flight training are equally Inclined In the ^sltlve dlreetli^. An exgamtm aad Imtenslfleatlon of t&ls research is now underway. Ultimately it may serve to provide cues in Pre-Flight to a /4 -If. ' II later manifestation of Inadequate iBotlTation in Flight Training. Vwcthermore, it is iBteBUjed that, vlth t3^e liitrodueticm of ohjeetive flight gradllig; this erlte3fi®n b« ixnr#s%igattt f&e fli|p^ le^l. HevixLg for a moment oul «f i^alm of moii^tion and morale studies, s^ie oeBtlon ml^t he made of a projeet recezrtly ceopleted, hut as yet ttapcth- lishst, la the sfhere #f leaisirsEMp ide&t£fie«l£@g. la this iHVestigati®B, use was made of the buddy-nomination form irtileh h&S been used widely in sim- ilar settings . \^^liiSmi in -^lelr third aoath at the Haval School @f Bre-Fli^t vere allied to n^alBate menSmcn &f their seetiom f®r a position of military leadership. A leadership score was then developed for each qgte^ on the basis of these nomlmatlOBS. fhls seore was thereixpoa correlated vlth seorra which tie ^2ii^^had ohtaiaed oia a variety ef measures, aaeog th«a saJSaMM of authoritarianism, the California F-Scale. The hypothesis under test was that thero -tnaold be a si^ificE^t positive relationship between seores m leadership and n&mtm on author itarissaisa, as seasi^et hy^ this seal^e; it will be recalled that a "high" score on the F-Scale Is considered to be "auth- oritarian.*' results obtained vere aegative. It was fomd tha^ there was a lotr, aevertheless sigaifieattt , negative relationship betvreiea IHie lesdsr- ship score derived from buddy-nGmlBatlons and the score attained by the cadet on autheritariaaism. Furthezmore, it was foaad that the ACS test correlated pssitively irith the leadership sceire aad negatively triiih the atithorltariaalsm, score. Correction was then undertaken by the computation of a partial r betveen Xiiei^aikif and asthoritariaalsm with ACS held constaat; the relatioasfalp re- ' Biaitret negative and still sigii^^trcaet although, of course, dlMialshed somef^t in magnitude. Finally, It was found that of all variables the ratings given the on "military bearing aad dlBclpline*' (OLQ) by the Marime officers ' -5- ' II iB ^^ge of dlscipllBe correlated at the highest magnitfliae ^ ,55) with the lea^rsMp scores ^ bmt Sid mb e&rrelate "begrmd the zero level vith aicyidr- itarisiiiism. It -was concltided frm. this stoil^ that wI-^Ib this eoBtext a predisposition toward authoritarianism is contraindicatftTe of selection "by peers fsr a p@sltlOB ®f military leadership; that iBtelligence f@ias a sig- fiificant pesitlTe eosq^ent of biiMy-^^tomiBatleKs la thii setting; aat, ftm^j^i that the sltiaation acts to specify "leadership" as reflected in the relatively hi^ mmi2&t±m "between QLQ (''milttwi^ "hearliig and disciplime") and the iCUddy nminatiotis . These results are of particular interest due to their relationship to f Indiiigs @f a previous stoSy i^leh indieated tlmMi^u^ perceptlem <^ the military leker^ip role to he essentially aatheiltsalsBa. That ■^es'e should exist a difference between this perception and their actual selection of a leader fes^ps is not too stxrpriii^. It will he recalled from ^le kmvlUm& Soldier , for example, that eallsted nea Indicated that they would he more democratic were they in a position of leadership while, at the same time, they continued to accept such leadership as was accorded them hy the military In- stitution. Shis duality does previa the basis for stme further research, which we hope to implement, in the area of role perception as opposed to role function. In closing this report, it might be desirable to review briefly the current tasks underway at Pensacola. First, we are attempting to identify potential cases of withdrawal as early in tzmining as possible; second, we are seeking to develop and validate an attitude inventory itoidi may serve 6s an indirect measure of motivationj third, we are endeavoring to study and Improve the morale of the on-b^aM lavCad pc^fulatioa tif si^est:!^ a^fpropriate changes in the training situation; and fourth, we are stuflying some of the ^ ' -6- ' ' II situational requirements of leadership specific to otir major goals of more efficient seXectlcm and improved eonditioQS of training. C 1 BHLIOGEAm* 1. Grinsted, A. D. and Hollander^ E. P. An Investigation of the motivational factors in failure to coog)lete the Maval Air TraSi^a^ Ij^i^fe. * Protest HHidDer KM 001 058.01, 30 August 195I-. 2. Bair, J. Hon-test predictors of attrition the Haval Mr fralaiag 'mm^m - Project nuaiber HM 001 OjS.OJ.C^, 25 A]^il 1^52. 3. Hollander, E. P. and Bair, J. T. The significance of attitudes toward authority-figures In dls criminating between Uaval Aviation Cadets of "High" and "lew" motivation . Project Number EM 001 05tJ.05.03, 27 Bair, J. T. and Hollander, E. P. The significance of attltud.e s toward peers in dlscr^ff1yatlng hetveen Kaval Aviation Cadets of ''' h'i^'" ' and ^liw" iotlvatl^B. Prefect HBaber BM 001 05tJ.O5,0»»-, 1 August 1952 * flie et^iiiing listet 1ii^®fr imre oeB^l^ted atLthe S. laval Siehool of Aviation MedieiBe, HAS, Peaiaaeola, Florida.